170520132112
A span of houses, 3 each way.
A
medicated set
of tricks gives you the chance
to catch
the proper screams.
170520132103
-Now what is that, no. You know what, head checked. He needs to get his head checked…I haven’t heard from the cunt since this morning when he said ass blaster. Your mate.
-Ass. Tart.
-That is sick, that is sick…that is, it doesn’t get any worse than that.
-You and your tory mate.
-A right fuck wit.
-Menzies and howard. That is photoshopped. There is not a doubt, that, well, I hope, that picture is not photo…shopped.
230320131818
-I can’t really remember how they normally go, I remembered it on last week something. It was at ben’s house (who is this ben) and I had just got there for his birthday. He is a pisces. We were celebrating for his birthday and then my family got there with my brother and his girlfriend, probably soon to be something more than that like his fiance. Then ben’s family got there with all my aunties and uncles. Then what was the most strange all of my work colleagues and employers got there. I think I have everything in my life vested in ben. I rely on him.
230320131815
One after another is a terrible
way of following
the
analogy.
They arrive with messages.
Salt, salt,
pandamonium,
salt.
100220131420
-In South Australia v Commonwealth Windeyer J said: “In Gibson v. The East India Company [1839] EngR 366; (1839) 5 Bing (NC) 262 (132 ER 1105) the Court of Common Pleas distinguished between acts done by the East India Company in its trading capacity and its acts in its political capacity as the government of India. Tindal C.J., speaking of the grant of a pension made by it in its political capacity said: “The grant in question, therefore, appears to us to range itself under that class of obligations which is described by jurists as imperfect obligations; obligations which want the ‘vinculum juris’, although binding in moral equity and conscience; to be a grant which the East India Company, as governors, are bound in foro conscientiae to make good, but of which the performance is to be sought for by petition, memorial, or remonstrance, not by action in a court of law” (1839) 5 Bing (NC), at pp 274, 275 (132 ER, at p 1110).”
010220131457
-In Livingston v Comissioner of Stamp Duties (Qld) Fullagar J said: “It is a commonplace that the law must, for a variety of purposes, attribute a locality to rights which cannot naturally be said to have any local situation. It has very frequently had to do this in relation to death duties, and especially probate duties. Everyday examples are shares in companies, shares in partnerships, mortgage debts. In most cases rules have now been laid down and are well established. It would probably be going too far to say that there is any general principle of law to be discerned in these attributions of local situation. From the very nature of things, such attributions must be in some degree artificial or conventional, and general rules must be modified to meet special cases: it is interesting to compare Attorney-General v. Higgins (1857) 2 H & N 339 (157 ER 140) with Brassard v. Smith (1925) AC 371 . But, when faced with a question of the locality of a right, the courts have examined the nature of the particular right, and have generally localized it in the place where it must be exercised or enforced, or would normally and naturally be exercised or enforced. Thus a simple contract debt is held to be situate where the debtor resides. Proceeding on this basis, the courts have consistently held in a large number of cases that the right of a residuary legatee or next of kin, before the administration of the estate is complete, is a right against the executors or administrators to have the estate duly administered, and the residue ascertained and disposed of according to the will or according to law. From the nature of the right it follows that it must be treated as situate in the place of administration, or the principal place of administration, of that estate - the place where the executors are, and where they must, or most naturally would, be sued. The locality, natural or artificially ascribed, of the assets comprising the estate is immaterial.”
010220131420
-Stammler, Rudolf (1856-1938) Neo-Kantian jurist who argued that the purpose of law is not to protect the will of the individual but to facilitate the means of self-expression of each member of society. Stammler rejected the proposition that the basis of law rests upon a philosophical anthropology of the human person. Instead he argued that the basis of law might be found in the nature of law itself. From these premises he reasoned as theory of a right or natural law with a changing content of which there are two kinds of subsidary principles: principles of respect and principles of participation.
280120130858
-Thus (e.g.) to see if it is possible to wrong a god, ask what is ‘to wrong’? For if it be to ‘to injure deliberately’, clearly it is not possible for a god to be wronged: for it is impossible that God should be injured.
220120131943
-The objection that is made to the truth-functional definition of conditionals is that there is no requirement that the consequent actually follow from the antecedent. So long as the antecedent is false or the consequent true, the conditional is considered to be true whether there is any relation between the antecedent and the consequent or not. Hence, as the philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce once remarked, you can cut up a newspaper, sentence by sentence, put all the sentences in a hat, and draw any two at random. It is guaranteed that either the first sentence will imply the second, or vice versa. But when we use the words “if” and “then” we generally mean to assert that there is some relation between the antecedent and the consequent.
